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1 Introduction
Non-financial corporate debt-to-GDP ratio has risen globally since 2007. Corporate indebtedness in the
Euro Area increased by almost 14% from an already high 93.3% in 2007, Sweden saw an increase of
26.8% from 125.2%, while in Canada the increase was almost 40%.12 The COVID-19 pandemic crisis
has led to a further sharp buildup of corporate debt. US corporate indebtedness rose by 12.5% between
December 2018 and December 2020, much more than its total increase in the entire decade leading up
to the COVID-19 pandemic. Meanwhile, inflation has been rising. We show that corporate debt poses
a challenge for monetary policy in two ways. First, it introduces an additional income effect across
heterogenous households that counteracts the traditional substitution effect and affects the overall effec-
tiveness of interest rates. Second, it creates a greater trade-off between output and inflation stabilisation,
requiring a reassessment of policy priorities.
While a growing literature on corporate indebtedness focuses on the implications for investment
and aggregate demand (Abraham, Cortina Lorente and Schmukler, 2020; Bräuning and Wang, 2020;
Brunnermeier and Krishnamurthy, 2020; Jordà, Kornejew, Schularick and Taylor, 2020; Goodhart and
Pradhan, 2020), relatively less attention has been paid to how debt may hamper the transmission mech-
anism of monetary policy and its effectiveness in controlling inflation. In contrast, the buildup of public
debt has led to concerns about the future path of inflation.3 In this paper, we assess how effective mon-
etary policy may be in controlling inflation when there is a large amount of corporate legacy debt in the
economy.
We first build a flexible price static model and obtain the closed-form solution to show how legacy
corporate debt causes monetary policy to have a redistributional effect on income, impeding the effect
on inflation through the adjustment of money balances. We then extend the static model to a dynamic
setting and show that this effect impedes the transmission of monetary policy through nominal rigidities.
Our economy features two types of households, lender households, i.e. the bond holders, that accumulate
safe corporate debt to save; owner households, the equity holders, that own firms that in turn issue the
corporate debt. The differentiation between these two types of households is consistent with Fisher’s
(1910) narrative on the ‘enterpriser-borrower’ and the ‘creditor, the salaried man, or the labourer’.4
Firms face a working capital constraint à la Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) in that they must
borrow money to finance expenses for labour in advance of receiving income from production.5
1This is also prevalent in emerging economies: China, Chile, Brazil, and Turkey have all seen more than a 50% rise during
this period. Hong Kong’s non-financial corporate debt-to-GDP ratio soared by over 77% to more than 200%.
2Throughout the paper, the term ‘corporate debt‘ is used to refer to the debt of non-financial corporations.
3See, for example, Martin Wolf (2020),‘Why inflation might follow the pandemic’, Financial Times, May 19, 2020. In Q2
2021, US CPI inflation has jumped to 13-year high and the US economy saw the highest rate of core inflation since 1991, and
UK inflation has topped the Bank of England’s inflation target. The departing chief economist at the Bank of England, Haldane,
has also warned of inflation rises in the UK.
4see Mankiw and Zeldes (1991); Toda and Walsh (2020) among many others as examples of more recent applications of
this.
5Barth and Ramey (2001) provide empirical evidence for the working capital channel. There is also a long list of credit-
channel papers offering evidence on the cost channel of monetary policy via firms borrowing from banks (see e.g., Kashyap,
Stein, and Wilcox 1993, Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein, 1994 Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994, non-exhaustive.).
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Our analytic results show that contractionary monetary policy reduces real wages, and that the effec-
tive elasticity of labour supply increases with the scale of legacy debt relative to working capital, and, as
a consequence, varies along the business cycle through debt and working capital dynamics. When debt
is below a threshold, the traditional Taylor principle holds: raising nominal interest rates lowers current
inflation or prices. However, higher debt leads to a smaller fall in prices, meaning that monetary policy
becomes less effective in controlling inflation. This is because the presence of debt triggers a heteroge-
neous income effect across households which affects the usual substitution effect. These results reinforce
the importance of the heterogeneity of households and the relatively high pro-cyclicality of income and
consumption expenditure of high income and high wealth households that own an overwhelmingly large
share of stocks (see Parker, Vissing-Jorgensen, Blank and Hurst, 2010, for a deconstruction of the cyclical
properties of household groups in the US).
Traditionally, the effect of raising nominal interest rates lowers aggregate demand and causes prices
to fall through a substitution effect that puts downward pressure on aggregate demand. However, via the
income effect through nominal corporate debt, we show the aggregate demand curve shifts less to the left,
the aggregate supply curve becomes more elastic as a result of a higher effective labour elasticity, and
it also moves in the same direction as the aggregate demand curve. Therefore, in equilibrium, although
output falls responsively, prices only respond mildly. Interestingly, given working capital, when the
level of corporate debt is above a threshold, the Taylor principle becomes inverted. Raising nominal
rates actually increases inflation because the income effect dominates the substitution effect. Our result
offers one rationalisation of the ‘price puzzle’, that prices generally respond less than output to monetary
disturbances, increases with the level of corporate debt in the economy. At extreme levels of corporate
debt, prices may even rise after a monetary contraction.6
We then extend our model to a dynamic New Keynesian framework with heterogeneous households
and nominal rigidities via a Calvo Pricing assumption. We show that as the steady-state corporate debt-to-
GDP ratio increases, the coefficient of monetary policy rate on the dynamic path of inflation declines, i.e.,
a weaker effect of monetary contractions in lowering inflation. Then in a numerical exercise, we compare
the responses of the economy when the steady-state corporate debt-to-GDP ratio is low (benchmark) or
high, describing the increase in corporate debt levels in the US over the last 15 years. This quantitative
example considers both a contractionary monetary shock and a positive consumption demand shock
with a standard benchmark Taylor rule. The choice of a positive demand shock is motivated by the
question of how the recovery of demand post-pandemic could potentially affect the economy’s monetary
profile and pose challenges to price stabilisation. Model simulations shed light on the cyclicality of the
consumption expenditure of wealthy stockholding households and those who do not hold stocks. We
find that the consumption expenditure of owner households, that is, the equity owners, tends to be highly
pro-cyclical, whereas the expenditure of the lender households, those who do not own shares, is much
less cyclical. As the debt level increases, the more pro-cyclical owner households’ consumption appears,
and the more acyclical lender households’ consumption expenditure becomes.
6This price puzzle was first noted by Sims (1992) and has been documented and analysed extensively by subsequent work.
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On the dynamic responses, after the monetary contraction, inflation falls on impact in both cases,
before subsequently rising to the positive realm. Particularly, the subsequent rise in inflation is higher
in the high debt case than the benchmark case, suggesting the higher corporate indebtedness is, the
more challenging it is to rein in inflation. On the real side, output falls in both the high debt case and
the benchmark case, but it falls more aggressively in the high debt case. With the positive consumption
demand shock, unsurprisingly, inflation rises when demand picks up, and output also increases on impact.
Notably, inflation is much higher in the high debt case than the benchmark case, and the subsequent drop
in output and employment is also more severe in the high debt case.
Amid the pandemic crisis, monetary authorities may be inclined to re-evaluate the appropriate trade-
off between the objectives of output and inflation stabilisation. In light of such considerations, we also
conduct a counterfactual experiment where we consider a monetary authority who cares more about
output stabilisation than our benchmark Taylor rule.7 In this experiment, an output stabilisation Taylor
rule could bring output back up to the steady state rather quickly, whereas our benchmark Taylor rule
leads to greater and more persistent output and employment loss. Nevertheless, the output stabilisation
Taylor rule leads to a much higher inflationary profile. Thus, the overall takeaway from this experiment
is that the trade-off between inflation stabilisation and output stabilisation becomes acute with a large
volume of corporate debt in the economy.
Related literature. There is a flourishing literature focusing on (corporate) debt and its implications
for inflation and monetary policy (see e.g. Gomes, Jermann and Schmid, 2016; Ottonello and Winberry,
2020; Mian, Straub and Sufi, 2021). Much of the existing work has focused on the drag of debt on firm
investment or aggregate demand, or the impact of unexpected inflation on the real burden of debt, but less
attention has been paid to how nominal debt could affect the efficacy of monetary policy in controlling
inflation. Our work serves to fill this gap in the literature.
More specifically, Gomes, Jermann and Schmid (2016) investigate how lower-than-expected inflation
creates a debt overhang, and the authors focus on the macroeconomic responses to inflation changes. In
contrast, we turn the question around by asking how debt hampers the ability of the central bank to
control inflation. What distinguishes our model is that we show nominal debt may even be a source of
inflation even when the central bank tries to use contractionary monetary policy to combat inflation.
In a similar spirit, Ottonello and Winberry (2020) and Mian, Straub and Sufi (2021) show that mon-
etary policy is less powerful when the debt level is high or the distance to default is low. In Ottonello
and Winberry (2020), the authors show that the investment of low debt firms or those with high distance
to default is more responsive to expansionary monetary shocks, while the investment of high debt firms
with high default risks is less so; the concern there is not with contractionary monetary policy controlling
inflation. Mian, Straub and Sufi (2021) focus on household debt, propose a theory of indebted demand,
7This is supported by policy makers’ public speech as that, for example, the FOMC’s ‘balanced approach’ of accommodative
policy is more consistent with a Taylor rule that includes a much higher output coefficient (see Bernanke, 2015; Yellen, 2012).
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and show that large household debt lowers aggregate demand and the natural rate of interest.8 Whereas
both Mian, Straub and Sufi (2021) and our paper suggest monetary policy has limited ammunition in the
presence of large debt, the policy angles and the mechanisms differ. In Mian, Straub and Sufi (2021)
the policy angle is on accommodative monetary policy supporting aggregate demand, whereas in our
model, it is on the general ability of monetary policy to target inflation. Furthermore, the mechanism in
Mian, Straub and Sufi (2021) works through the demand side where the assumption of nonhomothetic
preferences generates the property that large debt levels weigh negatively on aggregate demand. Our
mechanism works through the income effect of nominal debt shifting the aggregate supply curve in ad-
dition to aggregate demand; the income effect of debt flattens the aggregate supply curve, which blunts
contractionary monetary policy in lowering inflation. In this regard, we see our work as complementary.
Other salient examples of corporate indebtedness in the macroeconomy include but are not limited to
Farhi and Tirole (2009), Bhamra, Fisher and Kuehn (2011), Occhino and Pescatori (2014, 2015), Green-
wald (2019), Darmouni, Giesecke and Rodnyansky (2020), and Lakdawala and Moreland (2021).9 While
our paper shares the similarity with many papers in this literature that inflation reduces the real burden of
corporate debt, it differs because of our general equilibrium channel through legacy debt and heteroge-
neous households. Much of the empirical literature on corporate debt investigates the real consequences
of corporate debt on investment, output, or tail risks (see for example, Mian, Sufi and Verner, 2017;
Jordà, Kornejew, Schularick and Taylor, 2020), but there is limited work concerning how corporate debt
affects the monetary transmission mechanism and whether it hampers the monetary authority’s ability
to control inflation, for which our model provides testable implications. Nevertheless, our results echo
a similar point in Schularick and Taylor (2012) that credit and money deserve to be watched carefully
when implementing monetary policy rules.
Papers including Gomes, Haliassos and Ramadorai (2020) emphasise the skewed cross-sectional
distribution of stock ownership, while the strong cylicality of bank versus bond financing of corporate
liabilities is documented in Becker and Ivashina (2014), and Adrian, Colla and Song Shin (2013) among
others. This suggests that the cyclicality of aggregate savings is important to the understanding of cor-
porate leverage implications. Furthermore, we argue that the distinction between households that own
equity and the lender/worker households that save, either through the banking system or through non-
bank financial intermediaries is important. First, empirical evidence suggests that the top rich invest
relatively more in stocks (see Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991; Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995; Parker, 2001;
Carroll, 2002; Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002; Campbell, 2006; Wachter and Yogo, 2010; Bucciol and Miniaci,
2011; Calvet and Sodini, 2014; Gârleanu and Panageas, 2015), and moreover, a significant proportion of
safe corporate debt are held either by households directly, or through bank deposits, or in mutual funds,
ETFs, life insurance, pension funds, which the ‘salaried creditors’ indirectly hold. As Campbell (2006)
shows, low wealth households hold overwhelmingly large proportions of liquid or safe assets and do
8Mian, Straub and Sufi (2021) point out that indebted demand is primarily driven by household debt, not corporate debt.
9The implication of high levels of corporate debt has also been studied extensively in the corporate finance literature focusing
solely on optimal firm decisions (see Myers (1977) as a classic example), but usually in real models that do not focus on
monetary policy transmission mechanisms.
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not participate in the risky stock markets. Second, Toda and Walsh (2020) also differentiate households
as an equity holder and a bond holder. Based on their model, Toda and Walsh (2020) provide empirical
evidence that suggests that the portfolio share of the 1% income earners in the United States concentrates
in stocks and that when the income share of the top 1% rises, the subsequent 1-year excess stock market
return falls on average. Toda and Walsh (2020) also show that this finding is not specific to the US. Third,
that the lender households supply labour and do not participate in the equity market is also consistent
with Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein, 2007, who show that zero equity allocations can be ob-
tained where labour income risks are highly correlated with stocks and produce results consistent with
empirical observation.
More broadly, our paper connects with the classic literature on inside money in general equilibrium
that dates back at least to Grandmont and Younes, 1972, 1973; Shapley and Shubik, 1977. In this litera-
ture, money is inside because it enters the economy issued against an offsetting loan, and the repayment
of the loan guarantees money’s departure, and, together with a non-Ricardian seigniorage transfer, the
price level is determined in equilibrium and money is non-neutral, even with flexible prices. This lit-
erature includes Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003); Tsomocos (2003); Bloise and Polemarchakis (2006);
Goodhart, Sunirand and Tsomocos (2006).
The next section provides some motivating facts, and Section 3 presents a static model and obtains
closed-form solutions for equilibrium analysis. Section 4 extends the static model to a dynamic setting
while Section 4.9 presents a quantitative example to illustrate the analytic results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Motivating facts
2.1 Rise of corporate debt
Following Goodhart and Pradhan (2020), Table 1 documents the non-financial corporate indebtedness of
both advanced economies and emerging economies in Q4 2007, Q4 2018, and Q4 2020. Two observa-
tions emerge: in the decade since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis leading up to the COVID-19
pandemic, there was already a significant increase in non-financial corporate indebtedness across both
advanced and emerging economies. Between Q4 2018 and Q4 2020, the rise in corporate debt has been
even more pronounced, primarily due to the pandemic crisis.
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Table 1: Indebtedness of non-financial corporations
Advanced Economies
US EA SWE CAN UK JPN
Dec-07 70 93.3 125.2 81.7 82.1 99.5
Dec-18 75.2 106.2 158.8 114.3 76.1 99
Dec-20 84.6 115.1 175.3 132.4 80 115.6
Emerging Economies
CHN KOR HK CHL BRA TUR
Dec-07 94.3 84.8 124 65.2 29.7 29.6
Dec-18 149.1 95.6 219.5 100.2 46.3 68.1
Dec-20 160.7 111.1 246.8 115.9 54 72.1
Source: BIS. Numbers express non-financial corporate debt as % of GDP.
2.2 Corporate debt, markup and inflation
Since 1980, the non-financial corporate debt-to-GDP ratio and the aggregate markup in the US have
both been on the rise.10 Figure 1a plots the time series of corporate debt-to-GDP ratio and the aggregate
markup in the US. Such a trend may raise concerns that given high debt and higher debt servicing
cost, firms with market power may raise product prices in order to reduce the real burden of debt, so
that post COVID-19 debt inflation becomes a possibility. The recent uptick in core inflation is very
pronounced, as can be seen in Figure 1b, which documents trends of core inflation and non-financial
corporate indebtedness in the US. The left-side graph of Figure 1b plots the quarterly time series of core
inflation (i.e., CPI excluding food and energy) and the de-trended corporate leverage since 2000. To
capture these features, the model set up in the next section features corporate debt holders and those who
owe the debt, and also follows the New Keynesian tradition by modelling non-competitive firms that
charge markups.
10De Loecker, Eeckhout and Unger (2020) find that the results hold across industries and sizes though are higher in smaller
firms. Moreover, Dı́ez, Fan and Villegas-Sánchez (2021) provide comprehensive empirical evidence suggesting the decline in
competition at the global level.
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Figure 1: Aggregate markup, corporate debt, and core inflation in the US
(a) Markup and non-financial corporate debt-to-GDP
Source: The markup data is from De Loecker et al. (2020).
Data on corporate debt and GDP are from Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System (US) and U.S. Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis.
(b) Core inflation and de-trended corporate debt/GDP
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US)
and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, retrieved from FRED,
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, and authors’ calculation.
3 Static Model
In this section, we present a stylised flexible price one-period general equilibrium with money in order
to fix ideas on how corporate debt, in the presence of a working capital channel, generates an additional
income effect of monetary policy. In Section 4 we extend the static model to a familiar New Keynesian
dynamic setting with nominal rigidities to show the implications of this income effect on the trade-off
between output and inflation stabilisation.
It is our thesis that the accretion of corporate debt makes models that assume no such historical legacy
to be inappropriate for assessing current conditions. That said, however, the introduction of history and
time makes it more complicated to apply static one-period models. In particular, we assume that there
are two types of households: the first are ‘owner households’ that own firms, which is in accord with the
usual assumptions, or the ‘enterpriser-borrower’ à la Fisher (1910). But the innovation in our paper is
that we assume that the counterpart to the historical debt owed by firms is held in funds to which ‘lender
and worker households’ were required to contribute from previous periods, and this type of households
is essentially Fisher’s ‘creditor, the salaried man, or the labourer’. These funds pay out a proportion of
their accumulated returns from corporate debt, D, depending on past interest rates, R. Because it is a
one-period static model, we then assume that both owner households and lender households seek to use
all their available funds in this period for consumption. In the subsequent dynamic setting, we relax this
assumption and model the saving decision of the lender households, where both the quantity and the
price of debt are endogenised.
For the rest, the underlying assumptions are more standard. The static model illustrates a one-period
production economy and the period is divided into sub-periods, morning and evening. A unit measure of
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firms produce different types of consumption goods, so firms possess market power. A central bank exists
to supply liquidity against offsetting credits and sets the policy rate, which we take as the borrowing
cost in the money market. Owner households are endowed with a monetary (fiat) endowment and all
private agents can borrow inside money against an offsetting credit from the money market should they
wish. Lender households supply labour endogenously. There are two transaction moments in the period,
which we term, ‘morning’ and ‘evening’. In the morning, firms borrow from the money market to obtain
liquidity and pay wages. This is the working capital financing in advance constraint that follows a long
tradition in the literature on the cost channel of the monetary transmission mechanism (see Blinder,
1987; Farmer, 1984, 1988a,b; Fuerst, 1992; Christiano et al., 2005, 2015, non-exhaustive). Production
then takes place. All output is then sold in the evening. Households carry their wealth and income into
the evening to purchase goods. Firms repay debt that comes due in the evening.
3.1 Households
Owner households and lender households are indexed by h ∈ {o, l} respectively and they demand a










with chj representing the quantity of goods variety j consumed by the household, and θ > 1 being the
elasticity of substitution between goods varieties. A lower θ leads to a higher markup set by the firms.









Owner households are shareholders of the firms, and the rest of the households are lenders to the
firms. Each owner household is endowed with a monetary (fiat) endowment mo ≥ 0. We now outline
the maximisation programme for the owner households and the lender households.
3.1.1 Owner Households
Owner households have a monetary endowment of m0 and profits of Π from all firms as income. They
spend the income on consumption co. Their preference is represented by (3),
U = co. (3)
In the morning, initial cash balances are simply carried over till the evening without earning interest.
In the evening, the owner household receives the profits of the firm and spends any unspent money on
goods. Their flow constraint is (4),
Pco = Π +mo. (4)
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3.1.2 Lender Households
Lender households have wage income of wLl, and net debt repayment ψRD as income sources, where
w denotes the nominal wage, Ll is the labour supply, R is the gross interest rate of the debt, D is the
total stock of debt firms owe to the Lender Households, and ψ is the proportion of debt that comes due
in the evening. We refer to D as the legacy debt, and the repayment of debt principal ψD and its interest
rate R will be made endogenous in the dynamic section of the model.
Lender households’ preference is represented by (5),11 and they choose consumption and the supply
of labour,
U = log(cl)− L. (5)
In the morning the lender households obtain their labour income and carry the money till the evening
m̂l = wLl. (6)
In the evening they receive the debt repayment. They spend the repayment of debt and their labour
income on goods. Their effective flow budget constraint is (7)
Pcl = wLl + ψRD. (7)
3.2 Firms
A unit measure of firms is owned by owner households. Firm j produces good j according to a linear
production function as below, where yj is firm j’s output, lj is the labour it demands and A denotes
technology.
yj = Alj . (8)
Let bj be the amount of liquidity the firm obtains from the money market by borrowing, and i be the
monetary policy rate. Equation (9) is the liquidity constraint firm j faces in the morning. It states that
firm j uses the money market bj to pay for wages, essentially the working capital financing constraint.
Equation (10) states that at the end of the period the firm uses the sales proceeds to pay back money
market credit bj(1 + i), repay the legacy debt plus interest due (ψRD) and distribute profits πj . As we
assume strictly positive interest rates, each constraint binds.
Firm j maximises profits πj from the perspective of owner households by choosing labour lj and
money market liquidity bj , and most crucially, by setting the price of its own goods variety pj monopo-
listically.
11This specification was simple enough to incorporate meaningful substitution between consumption and leisure and still
permit analytic results. Nevertheless, in the New Keynesian extension in the next section we use more standard preferences.
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The morning constraint is
wlj = bj , (9)
the evening constraint is
πj + ψRD + bj(1 + i) = pjyj , (10)
and the flow budget constraint is:
πj + (1 + i)wlj + ψRD = pjyj . (11)
3.3 Equilibrium
Equilibrium is defined as an allocation of resources and positive prices, given a positive monetary policy
rate and monetary endowment, and legacy debt such that
(i) firms set prices while taking into account the price impact on demand,
(ii) agents maximise subject to their budget and liquidity constraints,
(iii) goods market, labour market, and money market clear, and expectations are rational.
We now characterise the equilibrium to show that the combination of legacy debt and working capital
can provide clear monetary transmission mechanisms, even when allowing prices to adjust. To start with,
Lemma 1 below summarises how real wage and the effective labour supply elasticity respond after a
contractionary monetary policy shock (see Appendix A for the proof).
Lemma 1.
1. Contractionary monetary policy reduces real wages.
2. Given the price level, the effective labour supply elasticity with respect to real wages is increasing
on the real value of legacy debt and deceasing on the real value of working capital.
The above lemma first shows that real wages fall in response to a contractionary monetary policy
shock. Furthermore the markup, σ interacts with the policy rate positively. Through the working capital
channel alone, the fall in real wages is unambiguous, in contrast to canonical sticky wage models. Fur-
thermore, Lemma 1 implies that the effective labour supply elasticity in our model depends not only on
preferences but also depends on the state of the economy through legacy debt and the working capital
used in the economy. In contrast, in Christiano et al. (1997) the labour supply elasticity only depends on
the parameter for leisure in preferences and their model’s empirical performance depends sensitively on
this parameter.
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3.4 Distribution of Income and Aggregate Demand
Aggregate profits Π can be derived from (11) as
Π
P
= Y − (1 + i)w̃L− ψRD
P
. (12)
The income, and hence, the demand from the owner household can be obtained by substituting (68)




P , can be represented as
mo
P






From this it follows that raising interest rates actually increases demand from owner households. This
is because raising interest rates lowers the demand for labour, and the wage bill for the firm decreases
sufficiently which puts upward pressure on profits.
We can combine the owner and lender households’ budget constraints ( 1P (ψRD+wL+ Π +m)) to
obtain the expression (14) for aggregate demand in equilibrium,12
m
P









From (14) we can see two effects of monetary policy. Contractionary monetary policy that increases
i may increase or decrease aggregate demand depending on how large legacy debt is. On the one hand,
higher interest rates increase the financing cost of labour and less is demanded. As a result, real wages
decrease, causing downward pressure on aggregate demand. This is the usual substitution effect. On the
other hand, the presence of legacy debt renders labour supply more elastic (see Lemma 1), so that the
increase in i causes the decrease in wage expenditure to dominate the increase the financing costs. This
leads to upward pressure on profits and owner households’ income, and hence, aggregate demand. This
is the income effect through legacy debt. We collect the insights so far in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, the response of aggregate demand to contractionary monetary policy
(increasing i) depends positively on legacy debt.
The income effect of monetary policy crucially depends on the presence of legacy debt and heteroge-
neous households. This can also be seen through the supply of labour which depends on the distribution








). With a representative household
the income effect disappears even when legacy debt is present, and contractionary monetary policy al-
ways decreases aggregate demand. To see this, we compare the model with the outcome if we had a
12m = mo denotes the aggregate monetary endowment of households.
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and substituting in aggregate profits, aggregate demand becomes
m
P
+ Y − i A
σ(1 + i)
. (16)
Comparing (14) and (16), given a price level, raising interest rates only reduces aggregate demand in
the representative agent case. This is because in the representative agent case, the distribution of income
does not matter, the upward pressure on profits from lower wage expenditure is exactly offset by the
increase in financing costs, and hence, the income effect is no longer present.
Building on the above analysis, we derive the closed-form solution for the price level and allocation
in Appendix B. The derivation steps to obtain the closed-form solution lead to the following corollary.
Corollary 1. In equilibrium, both nominal profits and real profits fall when nominal interest rates rise.
Even though the rise of nominal interest rates reduces wage expenditure, it also causes revenue to
go down due to the drop in labour supply. In equilibrium firm profits unambiguously fall when nominal
interest rates rise, and vice versa, which is consistent with the empirical facts documented in Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997).
We now characterise the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and state the central result in
the following proposition (see the proof in Appendix C).
Proposition 2. In equilibrium
1. when legacy debt is sufficiently low (iψRD < b),
(a) the standard Taylor principle applies,
(b) the higher debt is, the less effective is raising interest rates in lowering current inflation;
2. when legacy debt is sufficiently high (iψRD > b),
(a) the Taylor principle is inverted - raising interest rates increases current inflation,
(b) the higher debt, the worse inflation caused by raising interest rates.
Proposition 2 highlights that the transmission of monetary policy crucially depends on the amount
of legacy debt ψRD relative to working capital b. The standard Taylor principle holds (εPi < 0) iff
iψRD < b. When iψRD < b holds, an increase in legacy debt increases the labour supply elasticity
and thus flattens the AS curve. So when nominal rates rise, current inflation falls less than in the case
with lower debt. Hence, the higher the debt is, the weaker prices respond, and prices respond less than
output to monetary disturbances, which provides an alternative mechanism to rationalise the price puzzle.
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When iψRD > b the Taylor principle is inverted and εPi > 0. That is, if debt is extremely high relative
to working capital liquidity, raising interest rates raises the rate of inflation. This phenomenon is also
documented in the empirical literature.
To reinforce intuition, we use the aggregate supply AS and aggregate demand AD for the goods
market to illustrate a low debt scenario and a high debt scenario with a rise in the policy rate. For this
AS-AD diagram, we have factored in the clearing of labour market and money market, but not the goods
market (P, y); therefore, we are able to express the AS and AD as functions of output y, price level P ,
and exogenous parameters m, i,D, σ,A, ψ,R. The aggregate demand is expressed in (14). As can be
seen in (14), with the rise in i, the substitution effect shifts theAD curve to the left, but the income effect
through debt offsets the shift; thus, the high debt scenario sees the AD shift less to the left than the low
debt case. To obtain the AS curve, we combine the producer’s optimality condition for labour demand
(65), the labour supply curve (68), and the production function, and we get
y = A− σ(1 + i)ψRD
P
. (17)
As can be seen in (17), an increase in i reduces aggregate supply, and a higher debt renders the AS
curve more elastic.
Figure 2: AS-AD diagram: a rise in policy rate
The left diagram (a) illustrates a low debt scenario. The right diagram (b) illustrates a high debt scenario. Equilibrium e is the
equilibrium before the rise in the policy rate, and equilibrium e∗ is the equilibrium after the rise in the policy rate. The vertical
line at A is the output when there is no debt in the economy.
Figure 2 displays theAS-AD diagram to qualitatively show the equilibrium changes when the central
bank raises interest rates. The left diagram (a) illustrates a low debt case, and the right diagram (b) shows
a high debt case. In the low debt case, the rise in the policy rate significantly reduces inflation, whereas
in the high debt case, the rise in the policy rate only moderately reduces inflation but output falls more
responsively. This is because the high debt case shifts the AD to the left less and the AS curve also
becomes more elastic due to the income effect through debt. As could be expected, if the debt level is
exceptionally high, the rise in the policy rate may even increase inflation, as proved in the inverted Taylor
principle case in Proposition 2.2.
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4 Dynamic Model
We now show that the intuition and mechanisms illustrated in the static model hold in an environment
based on the canonical New Keynesian framework with nominal rigidities (via Calvo pricing) and an
endogenous monetary policy rule (Taylor rule). The dynamic version distinguishes wholesale producers
from intermediate goods producers. Wholesale producers are price-takers and can access short-term
financing from the money market. Intermediate goods producers are static price-setters with market
power. We assume a steady-state level of legacy debt which wholesale firms choose to roll over at
prevailing interest rates. Wholesale firms solve a dynamic problem by maximising the discounted value
of real profits, equated at the owner household marginal utility. We also replace the monetary endowment
of households with central bank open market operations in the bond market.
4.1 Owner Households





Etβtexp(εdt )log(cot ), (18)
where εdt is a normally distributed demand shock
13. Preferences are subject to their flow budget constraint
written in real terms as follows:




where π̃W are profits from wholesale producers, π̃j are profits from intermediate goods producers each


























q̃(d̃′ − d̄)2 + cl = w̃l + d̃
1 + η
, (22)
13We suppress notation for this for the sake of brevity and reintroduce it in the quantitative simulation. Nevertheless, the
shock should appear wherever the marginal utility of households appears, including in the forward looking equations of the
firms.
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where d̄ is the steady state value of debt and φd2 q̃(d̃
′ − d̄)2 is a quadratic adjustment cost for debt and η














Wholesale firms are price takers, and maximise the present discounted value of real value profits valued






They have a production function with capital k and labour l being the inputs andA being productivity:
yW = Ak
αl1−α. (26)
Capital is rented from the owner households while labour is rented from the lenders. As in the
static model, firms face a morning budget constraint and an evening one. In equilibrium, these can be
represented as the working capital constraint and the flow budget constraint respectively. The nominal
working capital constraint is represented by eq (27), and the end-period nominal constraint is represented
by eq (28).
wl = b (27)
πW + rkk + dW + b(1 + i) = pW yW + qd
′
W , (28)
where pW is the nominal value of a unit of wholesale goods, and b is the money that wholesale
firms borrow from short-term money market at nominal interest rate i. d′W is the nominal value of inter-
temporal bonds sold at price q, and which is repaid one period in the future. Define the real value of




P , and recall that
inflation is given by 1 + η = PP−1 . With this, we obtain the real flow budget constraints as follows:
w̃l = b̃, (29)
π̃W + r̃kk +
1
1 + η














Optimality with respect to capital and labour are




(1− α)p̃W yW /l. (33)








α ((1 + i)w̃)1−α(rk)
α. (34)
4.4 Intermediate Goods Firms
Intermediate goods firms purchase goods from wholesale firms, and have a simple linear production
function. They each have differentiated goods and sell that to the consumer, setting the price of the
goods they sell. The marginal cost of each firm is p̃W .




{pjyj − pW yj} (35)

















where p̃W is the real marginal cost.
Let φ be the probability that a intermediate goods firm does not change its price each period.














P θ−1y + φβEX ′2. (39)
With flexible prices it follows that
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p#j = σP p̃W . (40)

















= y − p̃W νy, (42)
where ν is price dispersion.
4.5 Final Goods Firm
The final goods firm’s problem is exactly the same as in the standard literature. Each period the final
consumption good, y is produced by a perfectly competitive, representative final goods firm firm. The



























and note that integration of (44) using the production function of the intermediate goods firm gives









The monetary authority sets the short-term interest rate of the money market according to a Taylor rule.
It also trades inter-temporal bonds in its regular open market operation. Let the overline symbol denote















where εi is a Normally distributed shock.
A meaningful trade-off between inflation and output stabilisation requires a real rigidity in the canon-
ical New Keynesian model (Blanchard and Galı́, 2007 call this this absence of the ‘divine coincidence’).
What is the appropriate output target is also unclear (Woodford, 2001, Garı́n, Lester and Sims, 2016).
We include the log deviation of output from its trend in the Taylor rule. We do this because the nom-
inal interest rate enters as a direct working capital financing cost, as well as because of the additional
transmission mechanism we obtain through corporate debt. These reasons imply that monetary policy
can meaningfully target overall output fluctuations and not only its deviation from the flexible price
equilibrium.
Given the nominal interest rate specified from the Taylor rule, the monetary authority supplies money
on demand in the money market M̃ . This is interpreted as discount window actions. In addition, the
monetary authority commits to trade a constant real amount of inter-temporal bonds µ̃, and we interpret





− q̃µ̃′ = 0, (48)
where the interest rate i is given by the monetary policy rule, M̃ is supplied endogenously to clear
the money market.
4.7 Market Clearing and Equilibrium
Below we summarise the market clearing conditions for final goods, money market, and the inter-
temporal bond market:
• The market clearing condition for final goods is
Y = Co + C l +K ′ +
φd
2
q̃(D̃′ − D̄)2. (49)
• The money market clearing condition is
B̃ = M̃. (50)
• The inter-temporal bond market clearing condition is
D̃′W = D̃
′ + µ̃′. (51)
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Note that the upper case variables coincide with the aggregate value of the population share. In the
quantitative simulations we calibrate our economy such that the population share of the owner households
is smaller than that of the workers. For analysis and derivations of the model we will assume that each
household type is of unit measure and so we use the lower case variables to denote aggregate quantities.
In addition, the labour market, capital rental market, wholesale goods markets clear. For the sake of
brevity we have assumed clearing in the description of the problem in the previous sections. Equilibrium
is defined as a sequence of quantities and prices, given the monetary policy rule, and the real quantity of
inter-temporal bonds traded by the monetary authority (µ̃), such that
(i) the monetary authority supplies real money balances on demand (M̃ = b̃),
(ii) intermediate goods firms set prices while taking into account the price impact on demand,
(iii) agents maximise subject to their budget and liquidity constraints,
(iv) goods market, labour market, capital market, corporate bond market, and money market clear, and
expectations are rational.
Summing up the flow of funds constraint of the economy, we note that the interest payment of
the monetary market equals the trading cost in the open market operation, i.e., ib̃ = qµ̃′ − µ̃1+η . Let
m ≡ qµ̃′ − µ̃1+η , it follows that M̃ =
m̃
i , and variable M̃ refers to the real value of money balance. The
system of equations that summarise equilibrium together with the closed-form solution for the steady
state and linearised dynamic equations are presented in Appendix D - F. Proposition 3 characterises the
real effects of money and legacy debt in the steady state.
Proposition 3. In the steady state,
a More legacy debt decreases real money balance and output;
b An increase in the nominal interest rate reduces real money balance, but such reduction is weaker
the higher legacy debt is;
c Changing the nominal interest rate exerts real effects in the steady state when debt d̄ 6= 0, but is
neutral when debt d̄ = 0.
4.8 Dynamic Properties
In this section, we study the effects of legacy debt on the dynamic properties of the model and on the
monetary transmission mechanism away from the steady state. Using (158) and (159) from Appendix F,
x̂1 − x̂2 = (1− φβ)p̂W + φβ ˆ(1 + η′) + φβ(x̂′1 − x̂′2), (52)
and then using (156) and (157) from Appendix F we obtain the Phillips curve:
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ˆ(1 + η) =
(1− φ)(1− φβ)
φ
p̂W + β ˆ(1 + η′). (53)
where the marginal cost is given by14
p̂W = −




( ¯(1 + i)− 1)
{
1−
¯(1 + i)(1− α)d̄(1− q̄)
2(w̄l̄ + d̄(1− q̄))
}





2(w̄l̄ + d̄(1− q̄))
.
(54)
As the steady state level of legacy debt increases, the absolute value of the coefficient of interest rates
on the path of inflation declines, i.e. changes in interest rates have a smaller negative effect on inflation.
This is summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Given monetary policy, as the steady-state debt level increases, the effectiveness of in-
terest rates on the path of inflation declines.
Here we show that the lack of ‘divine coincidence’ depends, in part, on the level of legacy debt. We
can see this by taking the labour first order condition and the working capital constraint, (150), (148) and
for analytical convenience set φd = 0,
p̂W = b̂+ ˆ(1 + i)− ŷ (55)
Hence the Phillips’ curve becomes
ˆ(1 + η) =
(1− φ)(1− φβ)
φ
(b̂+ ˆ(1 + i)− ŷ) + β ˆ(1 + η′). (56)
We can now substitute the linearised form of our term structure expression, ib̃ = qµ̃′ − µ̃1+η ,
b̂+ ˆ(1 + i) =
µ̄(q̄q̂ + ˆ(1 + η))
b̄( ¯(1 + i)− 1)
− b̄
b̄( ¯(1 + i)− 1)
ˆ(1 + i). (57)
This shows that the Philips’ curve depends on the bond price q̂ and working capital b̂. In turn, through
the lender household’s budget constraint, the bond price will depend on the steady state level of debt.
Putting this together, the path of interest rates that stabilises the path of inflation may cause instability
in output directly through instability in working capital that indirectly causes instability in the path of
intertemporal debt.
4.9 Quantitative Example
We now present our simulation, calibrated to the US. We take the population share of the owners to be
10% (and the worker-lenders to be 90%) to broadly match known distributions in financial asset holdings,
14The derivation is in Appendix G.
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in particular equity (see Toda and Walsh, 2020 and Campbell, 2006, for example). Other than corporate
leverage, we appeal to standard calibrated parameters from recent literature (see Table 2). The model
period is one quarter, and we set the discount factor β to 0.99, the same as in Ottonello and Winberry
(2020). We set the markup parameter to 1.25, which is at the low end of the estimated markup in
De Loecker, Eeckhout and Unger (2020) but at the high end of the value conventionally used in the New
Keynesian literature. Regarding the monetary policy rule, the response to inflation is set to 1.5 while the
smoothing parameter is set to be 0.5, similar to Gomes, Jermann and Schmid (2016) and in line with the
literature. Following Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2010), we set the output coefficient to 0.2 as
our benchmark.
A crucial calibration in this economy is the value of the corporate debt-to-GDP ratio at the steady
state, i.e. the steady state leverage. This parameter matters for the wealth distribution of the ‘enterpriser-
borrower’ and the ‘salaried creditor’. We set the benchmark leverage to a 75% corporate debt-to-GDP
ratio at the steady state. We then set a high debt leverage to 100%. In our numerical illustrations,
we compare the macroeconomic responses between the benchmark case and the high debt case. Our
choice of leverage is based on the ratio of the US non-financial corporate debt to the quarterly revenue
of non-financial corporate business from 2001 to date, which fluctuates between 3 and 4 (or 75% and
100% annualised) and has been trending up in the recent decade. We believe our choice of leverage is
reasonable, in view of the trend of corporate debt-to-GDP ratios in various economies documented in
Section 2.1. In fact, our high debt leverage, i.e. 100% corporate debt-to-GDP ratio at the steady state,
can be considered conservative. For example, the total non-financial business debt in the US stands at
a historically high level of around 130% of GDP in 2020 (see Jordà, Kornejew, Schularick and Taylor,
2020 and Federal Reserve Board Financial Accounts of the United States 2020). In Appendix E, we
report the steady state values in Table 4.
Table 2: Calibration
Parameter A α β i σ κ φ φd ρy ρη ρi
Value 100 0.33 0.99 0.01 1.25 0.1 0.7 0.001 0.2 1.5 0.5
We simulate the model with two shocks, a positive shock to interest rates, and a positive demand
shock. The former we assume to have no persistence while the latter a persistence of 0.9. A consumption
demand shock gives us an insight into the response of policy in a post-pandemic recovery.
The model simulation sheds light on the cyclicality of the consumption expenditure of the households
that own large shares of equity and those who do not. Table 3 presents the correlation matrix of key
variables with output. The consumption expenditure of owner households, that is, the equity owners,
tends to be highly pro-cyclical, whereas the expenditure of the lender households, those who do not
own shares, is much less cyclical. Moreover, both working capital and labour income appear highly
pro-cyclical. As the debt level increases, the more pro-cyclical owner households’ consumption appears,
and the more acyclical lender households’ consumption expenditure becomes. This result connects with
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the literature on the high sensitivity of consumption growth of wealthy stockholders to the stock market
and aggregate fluctuations. For example, Malloy, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2009) find higher
sensitivity of the consumption growth of wealthy stockholders to both the stock market and to aggregate
consumption growth, and Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009) show that consumption growth of high-
consumption and high-income households is significantly more exposed to aggregate fluctuations, among
others (see Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991; Parker, 2001).
Table 3: Cyclical properties: correlations with output
co cl b l d
y (BMK lev) 0.73 0.38 0.96 0.93 -0.76
y (High lev) 0.88 0.20 0.99 0.97 -0.86
BMK lev refers to the benchmark leverage of 75% (annual), or b̄/ȳ = 3. High lev refers to the high debt leverage of 100%
(annual), or b̄/ȳ = 4. co is the consumption of owner households, cl is the consumption of lender households, b is working
capital in real terms, l is labour, d is debt in real terms, and y is real output.
4.9.1 The Effect of Monetary Contractions
The tightening monetary policy shock we introduce is of 0.025 standard deviation in the nominal policy
rate, which leads to an endogenous increase in the policy rate of around 1 percentage point. Figure 3
shows the dynamic responses to the monetary contraction shock, where the blue line represents bench-
mark leverage, or corporate debt-to-output ratio, of 75%, while the red line represents high debt leverage
of 100%. As it shows, after a monetary contraction, inflation falls on impact in both cases, before subse-
quently rising to the positive realm. Particularly, the subsequent rise in inflation is higher in the high debt
case than the benchmark case, suggesting the higher corporate indebtedness is, the more challenging it
is to rein in inflation. On the real side, output falls in both the high debt case and the benchmark case.
However, output responds much more aggressively in the high debt case. This is because the presence
of corporate debt triggers the income effect of rising interest rates, labour supply becomes more elastic,
which implies that in the high debt case the AS curve is more elastic than that in the low debt case. The
positive shock to the nominal interest rates dampens both aggregate demand and aggregate supply, and
with a more elastic AS curve, inflation, although it falls on impact, can even increase slightly after a
monetary contraction (see Proposition 2.2).
Our impulse responses for real wages and labour confirm that Lemma 1 also holds on the dynamic
path (that the effective labour supply elasticity depends on legacy debt and working capital and that,
given working capital, higher legacy debt leads to higher effective labour supply elasticity). A monetary
contraction increases the borrowing cost of financing the working capital, driving down real wages.
With a high effective labour supply elasticity, the decrease in wages should drive down labour supply
significantly. As can be seen in the high debt case, labour decreases more than in the benchmark case.
Moreover, corporate profits fall after a monetary contraction.
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Figure 3: Tightening shock to nominal policy rate i.
Blue line is 75% leverage and red line is 100% leverage.
y-axis is % change and x-axis is the number of periods. Other than inflation and policy rate, all variables are in real terms
4.9.2 Output Stabilisation Taylor Rule
We now compare how legacy debt affects output-inflation stabilisation trade-offs and show that the trade-
off between inflation stabilisation and output stabilisation becomes more acute with a large volume of
corporate debt in the economy. With high levels of corporate debt, if the monetary authority is more con-
cerned about output and employment stabilisation, the inflationary pressure then is high; if the monetary
authority is strictly sticking to its price stability mandate, it could bring down inflation on impact but at
the cost of hurting output and employment persistently.
Figure 4 shows different Taylor rule coefficients (in which the output coefficient is set to 0.2 or 0.9 and
the inflation coefficient is kept at 1.5) in a high leverage regime (100% debt to GDP). The counterfactual
experiment we consider is between a monetary authority who cares more about output stabilisation than
our benchmark Taylor rule. To model this, we increase the Taylor rule output coefficient to 0.9, which is
among the high range estimated in the literature (see e.g. Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2000) and suggested
by policy makers (see Bernanke, 2015; Yellen, 2012).15
In Figure 4 the solid line corresponds to the benchmark Taylor rule ρy = 0.2 and the dashed line
corresponds to the output stabilisation Taylor rule ρy = 0.9. Compared with the benchmark Taylor
15As Bernanke (2015) pointed out that ‘in principle, the relative weights on the output gap and inflation should depend on,
among other things, the extent to which policymakers are willing to accept greater variability in inflation in exchange for greater
stability in output’. Moreover, according to Bernanke (2015), the FOMC pays closer attention to variants of the Taylor rule that
include the higher output coefficient, and that Janet Yellen has also suggested that the FOMC’s ‘balanced approach’ is more
consistent with an output coefficient of 1.
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rule, the output stabilisation Taylor rule (ρy = 0.9) brings output back up to the steady state within
seven quarters whereas with the benchmark Taylor rule the loss of output is greater and much more
persistent. Furthermore, the benchmark Taylor rule also sees more persistent loss in employment and
business profits than the output stabilisation Taylor rule. Nevertheless, the output stabilisation Taylor
rule leads to a much higher inflationary profile.






































Figure 4: Tightening shock to nominal policy rate i with no output stabilisation.
Red solid line is the benchmark Taylor rule (ρy = 0.2) and the dashed black line is the output stabilisation Taylor rule (ρy =
0.9). y-axis is % change and x-axis is the number of periods. Other than inflation and policy rate, all variables are in real terms
4.9.3 The Effect of a Positive Demand Shock
We now study a positive demand shock of 0.05 standard deviation and an autoregressive coefficient of
0.9. Figure 5 demonstrates the dynamic responses with the positive demand shock and our benchmark
Taylor rule. Unsurprisingly, inflation rises when demand picks up, and output also increases on impact.
The monetary authority responds by tightening monetary policy, so the policy rate increases. As the
policy rate increases, the cost channel of monetary policy starts to dampen aggregate supply, and with
the income effect of debt, the aggregate supply curve shifts inward and becomes more elastic, leading to
a subsequent drop in output. Notably, inflation is much higher in the high debt case than the benchmark
case, and the subsequent drop in output is more severe in the high debt case than the benchmark case,
for reasons already explained. Relatedly, employment in the high debt case subsequently drops but it
holds up well in the benchmark case, which also suggests that high level of corporate debt increases the
effective labour supply elasticity.
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Figure 5: A positive consumption demand shock.
Blue line is 75% leverage and red line is 100% leverage.
y-axis is % change and x-axis is the number of periods. Other than inflation and policy rate, all variables are in real terms
5 Conclusion
We have presented a general equilibrium model to study the effect of corporate indebtedness on the
monetary transmission mechanism. We highlight the result that high corporate debt levels render con-
tractionary monetary policy less effective in controlling inflation. When the level of corporate debt is
sufficiently high, contractionary monetary policy even increases inflation. While Irving Fisher’s narra-
tive is that booms and busts are caused by changes in the relative wealth of the ‘enterpriser-borrower‘ and
the ‘creditor, the salaried man, or the labourer’, our focal point is on the impact of such relative wealth
on the efficacy of monetary policy in controlling inflation.
The model, both static and dynamic, is kept simple to derive intuitive. In the dynamic model, we de-
rive the Phillips curve augmented with corporate debt, which shows analytically that the effectiveness of
interest rates on the path of inflation declines as the steady-state debt level increases. Then a quantitative
example is given to illustrate that the key results hold on the dynamic path away from the steady state.
More generally, our results echo a similar point in Schularick and Taylor (2012) and Jordà, Schularick
and Taylor (2013) that credit and money deserve to be watched carefully when implementing monetary
policy rules
The mechanism of our central result is independent of standard financial and nominal frictions. We
acknowledge that the attempt to write a tractable model to unpack the main mechanism and logic of
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debt inflation unavoidably leaves out many other features (such as financial frictions and labour market
frictions) from the dynamic model. As the particular features of this model are not suited to quantitatively
evaluate the effectiveness of policy, future research within a fully-fledged medium-scale quantitative
models is warranted. Nevertheless, our result that monetary policy effectiveness depends on corporate
debt levels adds support to the argument in papers including Curdia and Woodford (2010) that monetary
policy should be conducted taking into account financial market conditions.
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Bräuning, Falk and J Christina Wang (2020), ‘The great leverage 2.0? a tale of different indicators of
corporate leverage’, A Tale of Different Indicators of Corporate Leverage (April, 2020). Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston Research Paper Series Current Policy Perspectives Paper (87795). 1
Brunnermeier, Markus and Arvind Krishnamurthy (2020), ‘The macroeconomics of corporate debt’, The
Review of Corporate Finance Studies 9(3), 656–665. 1
Brunnermeier, Markus, Darius Palia, Karthik A Sastry and Christopher A Sims (2021), ‘Feedbacks:
financial markets and economic activity’, American Economic Review 111(6), 1845–79.
27
Bucciol, Alessandro and Raffaele Miniaci (2011), ‘Household portfolios and implicit risk preference’,
Review of Economics and Statistics 93(4), 1235–1250. 1
Buiter, W. H. (2002), ‘The fiscal theory of the price level: A critique’, The Economic Journal 112, 459–
480. 17
Calvet, Laurent E and Paolo Sodini (2014), ‘Twin picks: Disentangling the determinants of risk-taking
in household portfolios’, The Journal of Finance 69(2), 867–906. 1
Campbell, John Y (2006), ‘Household finance’, The Journal of Finance 61(4), 1553–1604. 1, 4.9
Carroll, Christopher D (2002), ‘Portfolios of the rich in household portfolios: Theory and evidence’. 1
Christiano, Lawrence J, Martin Eichenbaum and Charles L Evans (1997), ‘Sticky price and limited
participation models of money: A comparison’, European Economic Review 41(6), 1201–1249.
3.3, 3.4
Christiano, Lawrence J, Martin Eichenbaum and Charles L Evans (2005), ‘Nominal rigidities and the
dynamic effects of a shock to monetary policy’, Journal of Political Economy 113(1), 1–45. 1, 3,
3.4, A
Christiano, Lawrence J, Martin S Eichenbaum and Mathias Trabandt (2015), ‘Understanding the great
recession’, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 7(1), 110–67. 3
Christiano, Lawrence J, Mathias Trabandt and Karl Walentin (2010), Dsge models for monetary policy
analysis, in ‘Handbook of monetary economics’, Vol. 3, Elsevier, pp. 285–367. 4.9
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gali and Mark Gertler (2000), ‘Monetary policy rules and macroeconomic sta-
bility: evidence and some theory’, The Quarterly journal of economics 115(1), 147–180. 4.9.2
Curdia, Vasco and Michael Woodford (2010), ‘Credit spreads and monetary policy’, Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking 42(s1), 3–35.
URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2010.00328.x 5
Darmouni, Olivier, Oliver Giesecke and Alexander Rodnyansky (2020), ‘The bond lending channel of
monetary policy’, CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14659. 1
De Loecker, Jan, Jan Eeckhout and Gabriel Unger (2020), ‘The rise of market power and the macroeco-
nomic implications’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 135(2), 561–644. 10, 1a, 4.9
Dı́ez, Federico J, Jiayue Fan and Carolina Villegas-Sánchez (2021), ‘Global declining competition?’,
Journal of International Economics p. 103492. 10
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A Proof of Lemma 1










Ch, goods market clearing gives coj + c
l
j =
cj = yj and hence
∫





)−θ where Y is the aggregate bundle of goods produced. The
aggregate goods market clearing is co + cl = Y .














We now break the firm’s problem into one of minimising cost and then of setting the price. This will
help us to illustrate the working capital channel in place.
Cost Minimisation
From 11, Firms solve











where m̂cj is the real marginal cost and w̃ the real wage. This is the expression for the working
capital channel of Christiano et al. (2005). We show below that the presence of debt and household
heterogeneity amplify the working capital channel.
Price Setting
Take the first-order condition for optimal profits with respect to price and substitute 60:
0 = (1− θ)(pj)−θP θY − (1 + i)(−θw(pj)−1−θP θlj), (61)
0 = (1− θ)A− (1 + i)(−θw(pj)−1) (62)
pj = σPm̂cj (63)
Where σ = θθ−1 is the markup, where a higher value of σ means greater market power. This shows
that the real marginal cost is constant and equal to the inverse of σ in this example. Monetary policy has
an effect through the wage rate affecting labour supply and the corresponding effect on the distribution
of income across household types. Although a direct effect of an increase in the monetary policy rate is
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to increase marginal cost via the financial cost of working capital (as can be seen in 60), the increase in
the monetary policy rate reduces the real wage. This leads to an indirect effect pushing down marginal
cost. In the general equilibrium these two effects are cancelled out. As we shall shortly prove, even in
this case when monetary policy has no effect on the real marginal cost, it is possible for prices to respond
much less than output to monetary disturbances, simply owing to the income effect through corporate
debt.
Aggregate prices
Use pj = P , and substitute lj = L,







The optimality conditions for the Lender Households’ labour supply gives





w̃L = w̃ − ψRD
P
. (68)
The above equation shows that the presence of debt flattens the labour supply curve and supports
the high effective labour supply elasticity emphasised in the cost channel of monetary policy literature.16
This high elasticity may dampen the response of prices in the presence of monetary disturbances, even















B Proof of Corollary 1
To derive the closed-form solution for the price level, we simply equate Aggregate Demand and Supply
and obtain (70):










To obtain the closed-form solution for allocation, we combine all flow of funds constraints of house-
holds (4) and (7) and of the firms (11). This leads to (71), showing that when the working capital liquid-
ity that was injected in the morning exits the economy, the net interest payment of the working capital
liquidity bi equates the aggregate monetary endowment m - an outstanding liability of the monetary-
fiscal authority, which becomes monetary authority’s seigniorage profits. In the dynamic model, nominal
seigniorage profits are transferred to the next period.17
bi = m. (71)
The total money lent by the monetary-fiscal authority (inside money) is given by M = mi . This
is because the seigniorage profits of the monetary-fiscal authority is m and the total money supply is






























m(σ − 1)− ψRD. (74)
It follows that ∂Π/∂i = −i−2m(σ − 1). Since σ > 1, ∂Π/∂i < 0.
Moreover, given we have obtained the close form for the price level (70), the expression for real










As can be seen from the previous equation, real profits decrease when i increases.
17Fiscal policy is non-Ricardian. The monetary transfer is a government liability that is recovered through seigniorage profits
at a unique price level (as in the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level). See Drèze and Polemarchakis (2000), Buiter (2002), and
Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003) among others.
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C Proof of Proposition 2
Let εPi be the elasticity of the price level with respect to the monetary policy rate. We use (70) to derive










Therefore, εPi < 0 (the standard Taylor principle) holds iff iψRD < b,18. Otherwise, the Taylor
principle is inverted and εPi > 0. That is, if debt is extremely high relative to working capital require-
ments, raising interest rates raises the rate of inflation.








It is straightforward that εPi is higher when D is larger. Hence when legacy debt is below the
threshold that iψRD < b, then εPi < 0 and the absolute value of εPi is smaller the higher debt is. When
debt is above the threshold that iψRD > b, the opposite is true.
D Equilibrium Equations
Based on the analysis so far, the equilibrium of the dynamic economy is characterized by the follow-
ing system of equations consisting optimality conditions, market-clearing conditions, and the monetary
policy rule:






























w̃l = b̃, (84)
π̃W + r̃kk +
1
1 + η






(1− α)p̃W y/l, (86)










π̃ = y − νyp̃W , (89)











(1 + η) =
[
(1− φ)(1 + η#)1−θ + φ
] 1
1−θ (92)














y + φβE(1 + η′)θ−1x′2, (95)













d̃W = d̃+ µ̃, (98)
y = co + cl + k′ +
φd
2
q̃(d̃′ − d̄)2. (99)
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E Steady State
The equations required to solve the zero inflation steady state are:
c̄o + k̄ = π̄W + r̄kk̄ + π̄, (100)
1 = βr̄k, (101)






w̄l̄ = b̄, (105)
π̄W + r̄kk̄ + d̄W + w̄l̄(1 + ī) = p̄W ȳW + q̄d̄W , (106)
α
1− α
(1 + ī)w̄l̄ = r̄kk̄, (107)
q̄ = β, (108)
π̄ = ȳ − νȳp̄W , (109)



























ν = 1 (115)
d̄W = d̄+ µ̄, (116)
η = 0 (117)
ȳ = c̄o + c̄l + k̄. (118)
Aggregate demand at the steady state is c̄o + k̄ + c̄l. Substitute in households’ and firms’ flow of
funds constraints into aggregate demand for output, with the market-clearing condition for final output
ȳ = c̄o + c̄l + k̄, we obtain the following:






From the marginal cost of the firm we get that p̄W = 1σ in the steady state (simply by combining (112),
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(113), and (114)). Combine (111), (101), and p̄W = 1σ , we obtain the analytic expression for real wage at



















Combine the lenders’ first order condition for labour (103) and their budget constraint (102):













































































This is independent of household preferences. Keeping ī unchanged, the ratio of real money balance
to output is constant. We can now solve for the steady state real money balance. Note that (124) can be
re-expressed as follows:








= κM̄(M̄ + d̄(1− q̄)) (134)
(135)






1−α and the nominal interest rate
has an inverse relationship with the steady state level of money balance. As legacy debt d̄ increases, the
steady state level of money decreases. Furthermore, as the nominal interest rate increases, due to the
presence of the legacy debt, money balance decreases to a less degree.






1−α , so money is neutral in the steady state.
When d̄ 6= 0, money is non-neutral in the steady state.































































The expression above implies that as leverage increases, the quantity of real money balance decreases.
Given our parameterisation in Table 2, below Table 4 displays the model steady state values with
quantity variables normalised by output.
41
Table 4: Steady state values
c̄0/ȳ c̄l/ȳ k̄/ȳ b̄/ȳ π̄/ȳ d̄/ȳ q̄ r̄k
BMK lev 0.178 0.558 0.264 0.587 0.175 3 0.990 1.01
High lev 0.168 0.568 0.264 0.587 0.165 4 0.990 1.01
BMK lev refers to the benchmark leverage of 75% (annual), or b̄/ȳ = 3. High lev refers to the high debt leverage of 100%
(annual), or b̄/ȳ = 4.
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F Dynamic Equations
c̄oĉo + k̄k̂′ = π̄W π̂W + r̄kk̄(r̂k + k̂) + π̄π̂, (142)
ĉo
′ − ĉo = r̂′k, (143)
q̄d̄(q̂ + d̂′) + φdq̄d̄d̂
′ + c̄lĉl = w̄l̄(ŵ + l̂) + d̄(d̂− ˆ(1 + η)), (144)
ŵ − ĉl = l̂, (145)
q̂ − ĉl + φd̄d̂′ = −(ĉl′ + ˆ(1 + η)) (146)
ŷW = Â+ αk̂ + (1− α)l̂, (147)
ŵ + l̂ = b̂, (148)
π̄W π̂W + k̄r̄k(r̂k + k̂) + d̄W (d̂W − ˆ(1 + η)) + w̄l̄ ¯(1 + i)(ŵ + l̂ + ˆ(1 + i))
= p̄W ȳW (p̂W + ŷW ) + q̄d̄W (q̂ + ˆd′W ), (149)
ŵ = − ˆ(1 + i) + p̂W + ŷ − l̂, (150)
r̂k = p̂W + ŷ − k̂ (151)
q̂ − ĉo = −ĉo′ − ˆ(1 + η′), (152)
π̄π̂ = ȳŷ − νȳp̄W (ŷ + p̂W ), (153)
ŷW = ν̂ + ŷ, (154)
p̂W = −Â+ (1− α) ˆ(1 + i) + (1− α)ŵ + αr̂k, (155)
ˆ(1 + η) = (1− φ) ˆ(1 + η#) (156)
ˆ(1 + η#) = ˆ(1 + η) + x̂1 − x̂2 (157)
x̂1 = (1− φβ)(−ĉo + p̂W + ŷ) + θφβ ˆ(1 + η′) + φβx̂1, (158)
x̂2 = (1− φβ)(−ĉo + ŷ) + φβ((θ − 1) ˆ(1 + η′) + x̂′2), (159)
ν̂ = 0 (160)
ˆ(1 + i) = ρi ˆ(1 + i−1) + ρyŷ + ρη ˆ(1 + η) + εi, (161)
d̄W d̂W = d̄d̃, (162)
ȳŷ = c̄oĉo + c̄lĉl + k̄k̂′ + φdq̄d̄d̂
′. (163)
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G Proof of Proposition 4
Recall the public balance equation (48). After substituting the working-capital constraint, and the con-




− q̃) = 0, (164)
When we linearise, this becomes
µ̄(q̄q̂ + ˆ(1 + η)) = w̄l̄( ¯(1 + i)− 1)(ŵ + l̂) + w̄l̄ ¯(1 + i) ˆ(1 + i). (165)
Simplifying
ŵ + l̂ =
µ̄(q̄q̂ + ˆ(1 + η))− w̄l̄ ¯(1 + i) ˆ(1 + i)












q̄d̄(q̂ + d̂′) + φdq̄d̄d̂
′ + (c̄l − w̄l̄)(ŵ + l̂)− d̄(d̂− ˆ(1 + η))
}
. (168)
With this in hand, we can obtain an expression for output 147:




q̄d̄(q̂ + d̂′) + φdq̄d̄d̂




Take 150, and for analytical convenience set φd = 0,
p̂W = l̂ + ŵ + ˆ(1 + i)− ŷ (170)
= l̂ + ŵ + ˆ(1 + i)− Â− αk̂
− (1− α) 1
2c̄l
{
q̄d̄(q̂ + d̂′) + φdq̄d̄d̂
′ + (c̄l − w̄l̄)(ŵ + l̂)− d̄(d̂− ˆ(1 + η))
}
(171)
= (l̂ + ŵ)
{




+ ˆ(1 + i)− Â− αk̂
− (1− α) d̄
2c̄l
{
q̄(q̂ + d̂′)− d̂
}
− (1− α) d̄
2c̄l
ˆ(1 + η) (172)
=
µ̄(q̄q̂ + ˆ(1 + η))− w̄l̄ ¯(1 + i) ˆ(1 + i)
w̄l̄( ¯(1 + i)− 1)
{




+ ˆ(1 + i)− Â− αk̂
− (1− α) d̄
2c̄l
{
q̄(q̂ + d̂′)− d̂
}
− (1− α) d̄
2c̄l
ˆ(1 + η) (173)








w̄l̄( ¯(1 + i)− 1)











w̄l̄( ¯(1 + i)− 1)
− (1− α) d̄
2c̄l
}
+ ˆ(1 + i)
{
1− ¯(1 + i)
{




( ¯(1 + i)− 1)
}






where c̄l = w̄l̄ + d̄(1− q̄). Consider the coefficient in front of ˆ(1 + i)
{
1− ¯(1 + i)
{








( ¯(1 + i)− 1)
{





As ¯(1 + i)(1−α) d̄(1−q̄)
2c̄l
< 1 holds, it follows that higher steady state levels of legacy debt, d̄, makes the
coefficient of ˆ(1 + i) closer to 0 in absolute value.








w̄l̄( ¯(1 + i)− 1)















This allows us to obtain the following expression for the marginal cost
45
p̂W = −




( ¯(1 + i)− 1)
{
1−
¯(1 + i)(1− α)d̄(1− q̄)
2(w̄l̄ + d̄(1− q̄))
}





2(w̄l̄ + d̄(1− q̄))
.
(178)
To summarise, higher steady state legacy debt reduces the direct effect of interest rates on marginal cost
and increases the sensitivity of changes in debt.
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